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Chapter  2
Harnessing Knowledge Power 
for Competitive Advantage
ABSTRACT
A great many organizations rely upon advancing Information Technology (IT) in their quests for competi-
tive advantage. The problem is that as long as competitive advantage is based on IT and like resources 
that are obtainable or substitutable by competing organizations, it is likely to be ephemeral at best. 
Alternatively, competitive advantage enabled by tacit knowledge is comparatively much more sustain-
able, but such knowledge tends to be sticky and does not flow well through the organization. Hence, the 
power of tacit knowledge is great in terms of enabling and particularly sustaining competitive advan-
tage, but the corresponding dynamics can make it difficult to capitalize upon effectively. This chapter 
focuses specifically on how the power of dynamic knowledge (i.e., knowledge flows) can be harnessed 
for competitive advantage. The authors first examine in some detail how different kinds of knowledge 
and other organizational resources enable competitive advantage. They then discuss the dynamics of 
knowledge, looking in particular at how it flows through the organization. The chapter concludes with 
five key insights for use and application.
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
It is difficult to find an organization that is not 
interested in competitive advantage in today’s 
dynamic, global, highly competitive environment 
(Matusik & Hill, 1998; Chaharbaghi & Lynch, 
1999; Barney, 2002; Fahey, 2002; Teece, 2009). 
Organizational strategists have long discussed 
competitive advantage (esp. in economic terms 
such as earning superior rents, gaining larger 
market share, raising barriers to market entry, 
locking out competitors, and locking in custom-
ers; see Barney, 1986), but the comparatively 
recent advent and continuing proliferation of 
social media applications (e.g., social network-
ing such as Facebook, microblogging such as 
Twitter, collaborative projects such as Wikis; 
see Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010) is changing the 
nature of competition (Nissen & Bergin, 2013). 
Nonetheless, numerous empirical studies assess 
(Castillo, 2003) and provide evidence (Darroch, 
2005; Marques & Simon, 2006; Bogner & Bansal, 
2007; Holsapple & Jones, 2007; Zack, McKeen & 
Singh, 2009; Holsapple & Wu, 2011; Jayasingam, 
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Ansari, Ramayah & Jantan, 2012; Nold, 2012) that 
competitive advantage stems from the intellectual 
and other assets that an organization is able to ap-
propriate (i.e., assert ownership over), in addition 
to how such assets are used (Holsapple & Singh, 
2001) and the process capabilities that it is able 
to employ dynamically (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997). The latter part of this point is key: if an 
organization bases its competitive advantage on 
some assets that can be obtained readily through the 
market, then there is little to prevent competitors 
from obtaining the same or similar ones over time 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Hence any competitive 
advantage effected by the lead firm is destined to 
be ephemeral at best.
This is the case especially for information 
technology (Nissen, 2006). For a period of time 
in the Seventies, for instance, a few banks offering 
automated teller machines (ATMs) to customers 
enjoyed some competitive advantages over those 
without this technology, but today nearly every 
bank offers ATMs. Instead of conferring some 
competitive advantage, now ATM technology 
represents just another cost of doing business 
in banking. Computerized reservation systems 
(CRSs), as another instance, similarly conferred 
some competitive advantage to the pioneering air-
lines behind their development and initial deploy-
ment in the Eighties, but today nearly every airline 
uses CRSs. Instead of conferring some competi-
tive advantage, now CRS technology represents 
just another cost of doing business in air travel. 
Leading-edge financial investment firms, as a third 
instance, gained some competitive advantage in 
the Nineties through computer trading systems 
for securities such as stocks, bonds and futures, 
but today nearly every financial investment firm 
trades securities as such. Instead of conferring 
some competitive advantage, now this information 
technology represents just another cost of doing 
business in securities financial investment. The 
list of similar instances goes on and continues 
through cloud computing, mobile applications, 
tablets, social media and like trends that are cur-
rent at the time of this writing.
The same applies also to other primary re-
sources such as the traditional economic inputs 
of land, labor and capital. For instance, in terms 
of land, for centuries the vineyards of France 
enjoyed considerable competitive advantage over 
wine producers in other regions. However, world-
class, award-winning wines are produced today 
in California, South America, Australia and other 
regions. Fine wines are produced still in France of 
course, but the land alone is no longer sufficient 
for competitive advantage over vintners in other 
fertile regions of the world. As another instance, 
in terms of labor, for decades following World 
War II the relatively low cost and high qual-
ity of Japanese workers conferred considerable 
competitive advantage across numerous durable-
goods and consumer-electronics industries (e.g., 
machinery, automobiles, televisions, radios). 
Then labor-based advantages shifted to places 
like South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico and other 
nations. Today China appears to be capitalizing 
best on the basis of labor. Japanese firms remain 
competitive still in markets for some goods, 
electronics and other products, but the labor force 
alone is no longer sufficient to confer competitive 
advantage over manufacturers in other indus-
trializing nations. Such shifting of labor-based 
advantage is clearly not limited to manufacturing 
industries. A huge number of IT and service jobs, 
for two contemporary instances, have moved from 
Europe and North America to India, Singapore 
and like countries with relatively well-educated, 
low-cost work forces possessing technical skills. 
However, as educational levels and technical 
skills continue to rise in other countries, India, 
Singapore and like nations enjoying labor-based 
competitive advantage today are likely to find such 
advantage cannot be sustained through the onset 
of new competitors. As a third instance, in terms 
of capital, for centuries the days of gold coins 
and later even paper money restricted financial 
flows to relatively small geographical regions. 
Regional concentrations formed where large 
banks, industries and markets coalesced together, 
and such regions enjoyed competitive advantage 
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over others that lacked equivalent coalescence. 
Alternatively, capital can flow all around the world 
in seconds today. Global commerce no longer 
requires regional interactions between business 
people. Regional capital concentrations in places 
such as New York, London and Tokyo persist still 
of course, but the capital concentrated there is no 
longer sufficient for competitive advantage over 
other capitalists distributed worldwide. Only if 
an organization is able to combine, integrate and 
apply its resources (e.g., land, labor, capital, IT) 
in an effective manner that is not readily imitable 
by competitors can such organization enjoy com-
petitive advantage that is sustainable over time.
In a knowledge-based theory of the firm, this 
idea is extended to view organizational knowledge 
as an asset with at least the same level of power 
and importance as the traditional economic inputs 
(Drucker, 1995; Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996). An 
organization with superior knowledge can achieve 
competitive advantage in markets that appreciate 
the application of such knowledge. Semicon-
ductors, genetic engineering, pharmaceuticals, 
software, military warfare and similar knowledge-
intensive competitive arenas provide both time-
proven and current examples. Consider semicon-
ductors (e.g., computer chips), which are made 
principally of sand and common metals. These 
ubiquitous and powerful electronic devices are 
designed within common office buildings, using 
commercially available tools, and are fabricated 
within factories in many industrialized nations. 
Hence land is not the key competitive resource 
in the semiconductor industry. Likewise, people 
with training and experience in semiconductor 
design and fabrication are available throughout 
the world. Hence neither is labor the key com-
petitive resource in this industry. Similarly, even 
though semiconductor fabrication plants must be 
custom-designed, require over a billion dollars to 
build, and become obsolete within a year or few, 
a great many nations and large corporations can 
afford to construct such expensive plants. Hence 
capital fails to qualify too as the key competi-
tive resource here. Yet one semiconductor firm 
is hugely successful in financial terms such as 
earnings and market share. This firm knows how 
to design, fabricate and market semiconductors 
better than its competitors do. Hence knowledge 
is the key competitive resource in the semiconduc-
tor industry. This knowledge-based competitive 
advantage has been sustained for several decades 
now. Similar examples concerning computer 
operating systems software, networking equip-
ment, Internet search and other knowledge-based 
products serve to reinforce this point.
Two competitors can possess exactly the same 
kinds of land, labor, capital and IT, but differ in 
terms of how such assets are combined in the 
organization, integrated through work processes, 
and applied to develop products and services. The 
one with better knowledge can win, consistently 
and through time. Consider military combat (e.g., 
naval warfare), the history of which is replete with 
examples of “inferior” forces (e.g., in terms of land, 
labor, capital and technology) winning battles and 
even wars. For instance, recall the colorful era of 
wooden sailing ships with fixed rows of cannons 
along their sides. The outcomes of naval battles 
in this era were predictable generally on the basis 
of: a) number of ships in a fleet, and b) number 
and size of cannons onboard ships. The countries 
whose land, labor, capital and technology could 
produce fleets in greater numbers than those of 
adversaries fared well consistently in battles at sea.
However, such battles were fought commonly 
through broadside cannon exchanges between 
ships from opposing fleets sailing past one an-
other in long, straight lines. “Crossing the T” (i.e., 
sailing perpendicular to the line of ships from an 
opposing fleet) represented a tactic (i.e., a set of 
actions based upon knowledge) that could confer 
competitive advantage even to a smaller fleet of 
lesser-equipped ships (e.g., consider the Battle 
of Trafalgar). Because ships of the day had dif-
ficulty shooting forward, the “crossing” fleet faced 
comparatively little cannon fire. Further, because 
cannons were relatively inaccurate in those days, 
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the “crossing” fleet also had a long line of opposing 
ships to target lengthwise, whereas the fleet shoot-
ing broadside had comparatively small targets as 
ships pitched, rolled and sailed on the high seas. 
Here tactical knowledge conferred competitive 
advantage even to fleets lacking the materiel ad-
vantage based upon traditional resources of land, 
labor, capital and technology. In our current era of 
networked sensors, weapons (Alberts, Garstka & 
Stein, 1999) and Cyberspace capabilities (Clarke 
& Knake, 2010; Kramer, Starr & Wentz, 2011), 
knowledge remains a key competitive resource 
in military combat.
Even when leveraging knowledge for competi-
tive advantage, however, organizations can suffer 
the same limitations in terms of sustainability. 
As with the assets above, for instance, where a 
competitor can obtain the same kind of knowledge 
and apply it just as well, then any competitive 
advantage that may obtain (e.g., via first-mover 
advantages) is unlikely to be sustainable. Infor-
mation—and knowledge made explicit—falls 
generally into this category. When an organization 
attempts to take advantage of such information 
or explicit knowledge, it is required to protect 
it vigilantly or risk losing any advantage that it 
enables. This is the fundamental motivation for 
keeping secrets (e.g., military, trade, stock pick-
ing) and underlies laws for patent and copyright 
protection in many countries, as well as espionage 
and organized intelligence collection. Thus, not 
all knowledge offers equal potential in terms of 
competitive advantage. Speaking generally, the 
more explicit that knowledge becomes, the lower 
its competitive potential becomes (Saviotti, 1998).
Alternatively, tacit knowledge, particularly 
knowledge that is specific to a particular per-
son, organization, market or domain, is not as 
susceptible to loss. Gained principally through 
experience and accumulated over time, personal 
and organizational capabilities based upon tacit 
knowledge are difficult to imitate, even if observed 
directly by competitors. Consider a virtuoso 
violinist, for instance, auditioning for a lead role 
with a symphony orchestra; a competing violin-
ist (e.g., auditioning for the same lead role) can 
watch every stroke made and note played by the 
virtuoso, but this does not imply that he or she 
will be able to achieve comparable virtuosity 
simply through observation. The same kind of 
competitive advantage applies to experienced 
contract negotiators, aviators, golfers, chess play-
ers, parents, politicians and many other people 
whose performance is based principally upon 
experience-based tacit knowledge.
Likewise with organizational tacit knowledge, 
which manifests itself through organizational 
cultures, routines and procedures; simply observ-
ing a high-performance organization—say with 
considerable experience in a particular product 
or service market—does not necessarily confer 
comparable capability to a competitor. This is one 
driver of first-mover competitive advantage, and 
it helps to explain why it can be so very difficult 
for second-mover firms to ever catch up.
Contrast such knowledge-based competitive 
advantage to activities predicated upon keep-
ing explicit knowledge secret; were someone to 
view the secret recipe for making a soft drink, 
to discover the top secret keys used to encrypt 
military communications, to uncover a security 
trading firm’s explicit trade algorithms, or achieve 
like access to explicit knowledge used to enable 
competitive advantage, for several instances, then 
one would not expect for such advantage to be 
sustainable for long.
Hence relatively inimitable knowledge-based 
competitive advantage can obtain and be sustained 
readily on the basis of tacit knowledge, but such 
advantage is more difficult when predicated upon 
knowledge in explicit form. Speaking generally, 
tacit knowledge offers greater promise in terms 
of competitive advantage than explicit knowledge 
does due to its greater inimitability. Such inimi-
tability represents a proverbial two-edge sword, 
however. Even in situations of planned technology 
transfer between different units of a single firm, 
for instance, in which management encourages 
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knowledge to flow, such transfers are consistently 
problematic (Szulanski, 1996). The tacit knowl-
edge is “sticky” (von Hippel, 1994), clumps in the 
transferring experts and units (Nissen, 2006), and 
does not flow freely (O’Dell, Ostro & Grayson, 
1998). Further, even where substantial knowledge 
has been made explicit (e.g., through engineering 
drawings, standard procedures, lessons learned), 
in many cases it is not sufficient to write down 
the work steps and to expect people in different 
offices, plants, companies or regions to perform 
at comparable levels (Szulanski & Winter, 2002). 
We know more than we can tell (Polanyi, 1966).
For instance at the organizational level, despite 
overt help and cooperation from Toyota, advan-
tages stemming from producing low cost, high 
quality automobiles via the Toyota Production 
System have been elusive for numerous other 
companies attempting to replicate Toyota’s suc-
cess. As another instance, the US Government 
has encountered similar experiences. Many large 
contracts to produce major weapon systems (e.g., 
airplanes, missiles) have required defense firms 
to provide detailed engineering drawings, manu-
facturing assembly plans and production tools to 
enable competing firms to build the same systems. 
The rationale was to introduce a modicum of 
competition in the defense procurement process. 
However, “second sources,” as they are called, are 
able rarely to compete on a head-to-head basis. 
Even after being forced to share abundant explicit 
knowledge, the lead firm retains its knowledge-
based competitive advantage. Tacit knowledge, 
which resists articulation and transfer, accounts 
in great part for this phenomenon.
Organizations that develop tacit knowledge—
at the individual level as well as across groups, 
teams and organization-wide—enjoy much greater 
power of appropriation and lower risk of imitation 
than organizations relying upon traditional assets 
do. This depends of course on the organization’s 
ability to keep its knowledge-laden people and 
teams from defecting to competitors. Further, an 
organization’s level of current knowledge enhances 
its ability to learn new knowledge. The further 
behind one organization gets with respect to its 
competitors in terms of knowledge, the more dif-
ficult it becomes to catch up. Notice this represents 
a dynamic phenomenon. Not only is the inven-
tory (i.e., knowledge level) important to enable 
competitive advantage, but also the learning rate 
(i.e., knowledge flow) is critical to sustaining any 
such advantage that may obtain. The more you 
know, the faster you learn. This maxim applies 
to organizations as well as to individuals (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990).
KNOWLEDGE FLOWS
Drawing heavily from Nissen (2006), here we 
discuss the dynamics of knowledge flows. Like 
mineral deposits that are rich in some geographi-
cal regions and sparse in others, knowledge is not 
distributed evenly throughout the world or across 
organizations. Different organizations possess 
different kinds and levels of knowledge, and we 
note above how differential knowledge between 
organizations can establish a basis for competi-
tive advantage. However, we note above also how 
tacit knowledge is difficult to imitate, even when 
corresponding knowledge flows are encouraged 
by management within a single organization. This 
sticky nature of tacit knowledge is thus a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand it supports competitive 
advantage, but on the other it restricts knowledge 
flows within one’s own organization.
To emphasize this important point, consider 
an organization that develops a knowledge-based 
competitive advantage through the learning and 
application of an exceptional team of people in 
one particular plant, regional office or product 
line. This organization would seek naturally to 
exploit such advantage and to capitalize on its 
knowledge differential over competitors. Keep-
ing this exceptional team of people together 
and preventing defections to rival organizations 
represent two objectives management is likely to 
pursue to prevent knowledge from flowing out 
of its prize unit.
25
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Capabilities based on the tacit knowledge en-
abling this organization’s competitive advantage 
will be difficult for competitors to imitate. This 
contributes toward sustainability of its knowl-
edge-based advantage, but at the same time, this 
organization seeks to leverage such advantage by 
transferring key knowledge from its prize unit to 
other plants, regional offices and product lines. 
The same attributes of tacit knowledge that make 
it difficult for competitors to imitate knowledge-
based capabilities make it difficult also for other 
parts of the same organization to imitate. Such 
organization seeks methods and technologies to 
promote knowledge flows internally yet prohibit 
such knowledge from leaking externally. This 
represents a challenging problem of harnessing 
dynamic knowledge.
A case study of one successful automobile 
company in Europe (Loch, Pich, Terwiesch & 
Urbschat 2001) illustrates in part this difficulty 
of promoting internal knowledge flows. The 
company developed and implemented an effec-
tive means of improving research and develop-
ment (R&D) decision-making through the use of 
mathematical programming techniques. Despite 
demonstrating performance benefits of such 
techniques within the adopting unit, however, the 
company had little success in terms of diffusing the 
approach through other units within the firm. The 
manager responsible for the original advance had 
contracted with academic consultants who were 
external to the company. Although this manager 
understood the benefits and overall approach of 
mathematical programming, he did not possess 
the detailed expertise to implement it in his unit of 
the company or in other units. Hence the company 
failed to appropriate the mathematical program-
ming knowledge. Rather, it remained dependent 
upon external consultants. When such consultants 
were not retained by the company to extend the 
decision-making techniques into other units, the 
corresponding knowledge and expertise left the 
company along with the consultants. Knowledge 
flows associated with the mathematical program-
ming techniques ceased then.
It is important to note, the objective of promot-
ing knowledge flows internally within organiza-
tions is not restricted to select knowledge that 
enables competitive advantage. All knowledge 
required for an organization to perform its work 
processes and accomplish its mission needs to flow 
within such organization. Knowledge lies always 
on the critical path of work; that is, people must 
know how to accomplish a job before they can 
accomplish it, and they must know how and when 
to accomplish it well—generally in conjunction 
with others—before contributing to competi-
tive advantage. Hence even routine knowledge 
necessary to perform ordinary work processes 
within an organization must flow across numer-
ous dimensions.
For instance, we note above how knowledge 
flows between different organizational units are 
desirable where such knowledge enables com-
petitive advantage. Inter-unit knowledge flows 
are important also for organizations that seek to 
maintain consistent work processes, technological 
environments and product quality levels across 
units. Whether the products of interest are semicon-
ductors, pharmaceuticals, software applications 
or government services, knowledge is required to 
perform the corresponding work processes, and 
such knowledge must flow between units to ensure 
consistent performance organization-wide. The 
case of the automobile company above illustrates 
well how failure of inter-unit knowledge flows 
can prevent some units within a single firm from 
enjoying even benefits demonstrated in other units.
As another instance, knowledge flows across 
time are necessary also, in addition to flows 
across different organizations and geographical 
regions. Consider where one shift replaces another 
in a factory, processing plant or military watch. 
Management is interested in using the knowledge 
gained during a shift by one group to enhance the 
performance of the other group. Take a network 
problem, for example, in a global telecommuni-
cations firm. Such firms operate 24 hours a day, 
yet individual employees work generally only 
eight hours at a time. When an individual cus-
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tomer service agent leaves at the end of a shift, 
it is important for him or her to convey what he 
or she knows about the network problem to the 
person taking over. Otherwise, the agent begin-
ning a new shift may not understand adequately 
the network status to relate effectively with 
customers or to steer them toward work-around 
solutions to network problems. Similar examples 
in other settings (e.g., plant equipment problems 
in a petroleum-processing operation, health 
problems of a patient in a hospital intensive-care 
unit, intentions of commercial aircraft in flight 
as air traffic controllers change shifts) abound 
as well. Notice, such knowledge flows—across 
shift changes—represent dynamics occurring 
over relatively short periods of time (e.g., hours).
Alternatively, other flows require knowledge 
to move over extended periods of time. Consider 
how most organizations expect junior members to 
develop knowledge and expertise over time. Some 
aspects of knowledge and expertise can be acquired 
directly (e.g., through education and training 
programs), whereas others accumulate indirectly 
through experience (e.g., working on a particular 
kind of problem). Some kinds of knowledge are 
quite general and transferable broadly (e.g., engi-
neering principles and methods), whereas others 
are specific to a particular company, department 
and work assignment, and hence more restricted 
in terms of opportunities for application and trans-
fer. In some cases people can begin at a state of 
ignorance and incompetence yet develop knowl-
edge and expertise through a process of repeated 
trial and error (e.g., on-the-job training or OJT), 
whereas other work contexts require competent 
performance on the first attempt (e.g., surgery). 
In still other situations knowledge and expertise 
apply to individuals (e.g., the examples above), 
whereas group, team and department interaction 
requires collections of people to learn how to 
work together (e.g., basketball teams, software 
development groups, police SWAT teams).
In every case, considerable time is required for 
learning (i.e., knowledge to flow). The amount of 
time allocated for learning represents a manage-
ment decision. In the typical research university, 
for example, assistant professors are given six 
years to establish a positive national reputation, 
after which they face an up-or-out staffing deci-
sion, but the kinds of work they perform (e.g., 
research, instruction) remain the same for the 
most part throughout this period (and in many 
cases for years or even decades beyond). Most 
research universities have decided that six years 
of the same work after earning a PhD is enough 
time to become an associate professor. In a cor-
porate employee-internship program, as a differ-
ent example, new college hires may be rotated 
through different departments and jobs every six 
months. Unlike the research university, here the 
kinds of work new hires perform change with each 
rotation. Such organizations have decided that six 
months of the same work after earning a college 
degree is enough time for rotation to another job. 
The US Navy, as a third example in between the 
two above, rotates its personnel roughly every 
two or three years. Here all of its people (e.g., 
junior and senior, enlisted and officers, sailors and 
staff) change jobs on two- or three-year intervals. 
This military organization has decided that two 
or three years of the same work after assignment 
to a new command is enough time for rotation to 
another job.
Knowledge flows between people denote a 
related instance. Of course this transcends the 
other instances above, for ultimately nearly all tacit 
knowledge flows in an organizational context take 
place within individuals and between people. In the 
case of inter-unit transfers, people in the different 
organizations must learn from one another (e.g., 
about decision-making techniques). In the case of 
flows between shifts, people on the different shifts 
must learn from one another (e.g., about equipment 
problems). In the case of new employees, people 
must learn from some combination of the work 
itself (e.g., trial and error, OJT) and other people 
(e.g., supervisors, mentors, instructors, peers). 
Hence knowledge flows across different organi-
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zational units, geographical regions and points 
in time involve people and are necessary just to 
accomplish the work at hand (e.g., ordinary work 
processes), even where such knowledge may not 
necessarily lead to competitive advantage. This 
elucidates a critical point in terms of diagnosing 
knowledge-flow problems. Viewed in reverse, 
where knowledge fails to flow well, even to en-
able ordinary workflows, the organization may 
experience competitive disadvantage, as it fails 
to perform even its routine work effectively.
Consider the Business Process Re-engineering 
(BPR) movement in the Nineties, for instance. 
Conceived originally as an approach for radical 
change to effect dramatic performance improve-
ments in organizations (Davenport, 1993; Hammer 
& Champy, 1993), BPR provided a broad-based 
impetus and set of techniques to enable organiza-
tions to perform better with fewer assets. However, 
the focus of this approach shifted over time from 
one of superior performance to a cost-cutting 
mechanism. Profits rose at many companies, and 
competitors followed suit to avoid being left be-
hind, but in the US alone many tens of thousands 
of jobs were eliminated through the process. Many 
of these jobs belonged to knowledge workers and 
middle managers. After some period of time, it 
became apparent to several firms that critical 
organizational knowledge had left the company 
with the people who were “downsized.” Such 
people had to be rehired—oftentimes as expensive 
consultants or for far more than their previous 
salaries. The short-term focus on cost-reduction 
and job-elimination took place at the expense 
of longer-term performance and knowledge ac-
cumulation.
A similar situation is occurring at the time of 
this writing for a different reason. A large number 
of people from the Baby Boom Generation are 
retiring. Organizations lack the resources and 
techniques to ensure that Baby Boomer knowl-
edge flows effectively to the Generation X, Y, 
Millennial, and other groups that are performing 
junior- and mid-level jobs in such organizations. 
Indeed, the US Government estimated nearly a 
decade ago that half of its workforce would be 
eligible for retirement today (Liebowitz, 2004). 
This estimate remains relatively accurate (OPM, 
2008), yet despite such forewarning, the massive 
governmental organization remains perplexed 
regarding how to preserve the corresponding 
knowledge. This applies in particular to the kind 
of rich, experience-based tacit knowledge that 
makes seasoned employees so valuable.
Even within a particular organization, knowl-
edge can be observed to clump noticeably in 
certain people, groups, locations and points in 
time. The phenomenon of knowledge distributing 
itself unevenly across different people has been 
studied extensively for years (e.g., see Turban & 
Aronson, 1998). Researchers have examined the 
nature of expert performance and tried to draw 
generalizable comparisons with the performance 
of novices, for instance. Many studies of leader-
ship fall into this category. A whole industry of 
expert systems was developed in the Eighties 
around the idea of capturing expert level capabili-
ties and formalizing them in computers. Indeed, 
knowledgeable people have been painting caves, 
chiseling stones and writing books for millennia 
in attempts to share their expertise, and Society 
has developed many other techniques for experts 
(and novices) to share knowledge (e.g., stories, 
mentoring, apprenticeship, university courses, 
webinars, YouTube videos).
Since expert knowledge is tacit generally, it is 
sticky, and the corresponding clumps remain dif-
ficult to distribute. For instance, it is recognized 
widely that roughly ten years’ sustained and dedi-
cated effort is required to become an expert in a 
particular field, with accumulation of some 10,000 
chunks of knowledge corresponding (Turban & 
Aronson, 1998). Trying to share such expertise 
encounters the well-understood problem associ-
ated with “the fish.” Recall the parable of giving 
someone a fish versus teaching him or her how 
to fish. In the former case, one feeds the person 
for a day, but he or she becomes hungry again 
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the following day. In the latter case, the person 
learns to feed him or herself for a lifetime, but 
such learning takes time. Ask an expert to solve 
a problem, and he or she solves the problem. This 
takes care of the situation until its next occurrence. 
Now ask the expert to teach an apprentice how 
to solve the problem. The expert (or simply more 
knowledgeable person) must be willing and able 
to share; the novice must be willing and able to 
learn; and the organization must be willing and 
able to help them do so. Very few organizations 
accomplish such individual learning well at pres-
ent. As a general rule, individual knowledge does 
not flow well through most organizations.
Even more difficult is enabling knowledge 
flows at other levels. Because groups, teams, de-
partments, firms and even larger aggregations of 
people, for instance, are comprised of individuals, 
all of the same individual-level problems noted 
above are present within such organizations. In 
addition, knowledge is noted to clump in certain 
organizations as well as specific individuals. Ac-
counts abound of groups, teams, offices, units, 
ships, crews, organizations and like aggregations 
of people that are practically identical except for 
the individuals comprising them, yet in which one 
outperforms the others, oftentimes consistently 
and dramatically so. Identifying the sources of 
performance differences between apparently 
equivalent organizations is difficult enough, even 
though it reduces often to some kind of tacit 
knowledge that is shared within a particular group. 
Nonetheless, conceiving mechanisms for such 
shared knowledge to flow between two groups 
remains very challenging. Because the shared 
knowledge is tacit, attempting to write it down 
and disseminate it via books, standard operating 
procedures, lessons learned, Web portals, work-
flow systems, wikis, social networking sites, and 
other approaches relying upon explicit knowledge 
offers limited efficacy potential. Reading knowl-
edge that has been written down is not the same 
as learning it tacitly.
This same point pertains to enterprises that are 
separated across time and space, as well as those 
separated by organizational boundaries. Think of 
a new group taking over a work task from a group 
that has been performing it effectively for some 
time, or an organization in one geographical region 
that is able somehow to perform more effectively 
than its equivalent counterpart in another region. 
Knowledge flows are essential for power through 
competitive advantage, but enabling such flows 
remains a huge challenge for most organizations.
KEY INSIGHTS
Five key insights developed in this chapter help to 
shed metaphorical light on harnessing knowledge 
power for competitive advantage: 1) knowledge 
is distinct from information; 2) knowledge is 
distributed unevenly, and hence must flow; 3) 
tacit knowledge supports greater appropriability 
than explicit knowledge does; 4) knowledge flows 
must balance exploration with exploitation; and 5) 
enhancing knowledge flows requires simultane-
ous attention to people, processes, organizations 
and technologies.
Insight 1
First, distinguishing knowledge from informa-
tion is important. One effective operationaliza-
tion is, knowledge enables direct action (e.g., 
correct decisions, appropriate behaviors, useful 
work), whereas information provides meaning 
and context for such action (e.g., decision cri-
teria, behavior norms, work specifications). As 
a Gedanken experiment, consider two people 
tasked to perform a knowledge-intensive activity. 
These could be captains on the bridge of a ship, 
surgeons at the operating table, managers at the 
negotiating table, professors in a classroom, at-
torneys in a courtroom, or many like situations 
requiring knowledge. Provide these two people 
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with exactly the same information (e.g., books to 
read, charts and reports to reference, instruments 
to monitor, direct views and sounds, advisors 
to consult, others), but say that one person has 
twenty years’ experience, whereas the other has 
much less experience (or possibly none). Most 
informed leaders, managers and scholars would 
expect differential performance from these two 
people. Such differential performance can be 
attributed generally to differences in knowledge. 
Hence shuttling information around via comput-
ers, networks, reports and communications does 
not address the flow of knowledge, at least not 
directly or on the same time scale.
Insight 2
Second, knowledge clumps in particular people, 
organizations, regions and times of application. 
Knowledge power through competitive advantage 
requires knowledge to flow, but tacit knowledge 
in particular is sticky, difficult to acquire, and 
slow to move. This same property, which enables 
knowledge-based competitive advantage to be 
sustainable, inhibits simultaneously sharing within 
the organization. Hence knowledge clumps need 
to be identified, and knowledge flows need to be 
enabled through the organization without allowing 
them to leak externally.
Insight 3
This gives rise to a third Insight, which is fo-
cused on differentiating between different kinds 
of knowledge. In particular, explicit knowledge 
that can be articulated (e.g., via books, graphs, 
videos, software) is distinct in many ways from 
the kind of tacit knowledge that accumulates, 
often slowly, through direct experience. Neither 
is individual expertise quite the same as knowl-
edge shared across members of a group, team or 
other organization. Knowledge can also be quite 
situated, ephemeral and local, meaning a person 
on the “front lines” cannot always communicate 
the richness of what he or she knows to someone 
at headquarters. Yet people at headquarters tend 
to demand abundant information flows to sup-
port decision-making that is often made better 
on location. Of course, the person on the scene 
with detailed and local knowledge often lacks the 
high-level integrative understanding of managers 
at headquarters, and the need for functional spe-
cialists to share specific knowledge for complex 
problem solving is known well. Nonetheless, 
central to the point of power, tacit knowledge 
supports greater appropriability than explicit 
knowledge does. Hence organizational leaders 
and managers may benefit from an emphasis on 
tacit—in addition to explicit—knowledge flows.
Insight 4
Fourth, not all knowledge—not even tacit knowl-
edge—is of equal value, nor does knowledge need 
to be shared in order to effect high performance. 
Indeed, there is a classic tension between explora-
tion and exploitation in terms of organizational 
learning (March, 1991). Because resources such as 
time, energy and attention are limited, investing in 
exploration of new knowledge and opportunities 
limits necessarily the resources available to exploit 
the knowledge and opportunities that exist, and 
vice versa. Further, to the extent that an organiza-
tion focuses solely on exploitation, for instance, 
it can quickly develop competency traps (Levitt 
& March, 1988) and suffer from debilitations 
associated with single-loop learning (Argyris & 
Schon, 1978); that is, an organization can learn 
to do the wrong thing very well and not realize 
that its competency is no longer suited well to 
the environment. Likewise, to the extent that an 
organization focuses solely on exploration, as a 
contrasting instance, it can quickly see its demise, 
as competitors capitalize upon current opportu-
nities and take advantage of the organization’s 
time away from task; that is, the organization can 
prepare itself well for a future environment but 
fail to survive until such future arrives. Similar 
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tensions arise between learning and doing, sharing 
and hoarding knowledge, acquiring general versus 
specialized expertise, and like knowledge-oriented 
tradeoffs. Hence understanding the kinds of 
knowledge that are important in an organization’s 
particular environment is essential for promoting 
the most important knowledge flows.
Insight 5
Fifth, it is known well that organizational person-
nel, work processes, structures and technologies 
are interconnected tightly and interact closely 
(Leavitt, 1965). When seeking to redesign and 
change organizations to identify knowledge 
clumps and to enhance knowledge flows, it is 
important to focus simultaneously on all of these 
interconnected and interacting elements, together. 
Most people can identify quickly a technologi-
cal “innovation” that failed to produce favorable 
results when implemented in an organization, 
for instance. Bringing in people or teams with 
different backgrounds in terms of education, 
training, skills, culture and experience represents 
a similar instance (e.g., conjuring up memories 
of failed implementation), as does changing work 
processes or organizational reporting relationships 
and responsibilities without addressing personnel 
and technologies. Hence the elements people, 
processes, organizations and technologies operate 
as a cohesive system and should be addressed as 
an integrated design problem.
CONCLUSION
A great many organizations rely upon advanc-
ing information technology in their quests for 
competitive advantage. The problem is, so long 
as competitive advantage is based on IT and like 
resources that are obtainable or substitutable by 
competing organizations, it is likely to be ephem-
eral at best. Alternatively, competitive advantage 
enabled by tacit knowledge is comparatively much 
more sustainable, but such knowledge tends to be 
sticky and does not flow well through the organiza-
tion. Hence the power of tacit knowledge is great 
in terms of enabling and particularly sustaining 
competitive advantage, but the corresponding 
dynamics can make it difficult to capitalize upon 
effectively. This chapter focuses specifically on 
how the power of dynamic knowledge can be 
harnessed for competitive advantage.
We first examine in some detail how differ-
ent kinds of knowledge and other organizational 
resources enable competitive advantage. Tradi-
tional economic inputs such as land, labor and 
capital have long been used to obtain competitive 
advantage, but where competitors can obtain the 
same or substitutable assets, such advantage is 
likely to be ephemeral. Likewise with IT, and even 
information or knowledge made explicit, it must 
be protected vigilantly in order to preserve any 
competitive advantage that may obtain.
Competitive advantage based upon tacit knowl-
edge is different, however. The corresponding 
knowledge-based performance is more appropri-
able generally and inimitable often, which sug-
gests that competitors may find it very difficult to 
match performance levels. Hence such competitive 
advantage offers much greater potential to be sus-
tained over time. Traditional economic inputs, IT, 
information and explicit knowledge remain very 
important, of course, but organizational leaders 
and managers may benefit greatly by emphasizing 
tacit knowledge for competition.
We then discuss the dynamics of knowledge, 
looking in particular at how it flows through 
the organization. We find that the dynamics of 
tacit knowledge make it a metaphorical two-edge 
sword: it is difficult for competitors to imitate 
organizational performance based upon tacit 
knowledge, but it is difficult likewise for organi-
zations to share such knowledge internally. This 
pertains to knowledge flowing across different 
people (e.g., experts), organizations (e.g., busi-
ness units), places (e.g., branches) or times (e.g., 
across shifts). Although it flows comparatively 
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slowly, tacit knowledge can be learned, and the 
amount of time allocated—invested really—to 
learning new knowledge (e.g., via OJT, job rota-
tion, mentoring, training, education) represents an 
important management decision. Even in the case 
of ordinary workflows with little potential to en-
able competitive advantage, the failure of enabling 
knowledge to flow well can cause an organization 
to experience competitive disadvantage (e.g., if 
fails to perform routine work effectively). This can 
stem from management neglect as well as cost-
cutting actions, but it can occur quite naturally 
also as aging workers retire. In the current case 
of Baby Boomers, their huge representation in the 
workforce is causing many organizations today to 
face enormous losses of rich, experience-based 
tacit knowledge, and few such organizations appear 
to be equipped well to stem, counter or otherwise 
compensate for such losses.
The chapter concludes with five key insights for 
use and application: 1) knowledge is distinct from 
information; 2) knowledge is distributed unevenly, 
and hence must flow; 3) tacit knowledge supports 
greater appropriability than explicit knowledge 
does; 4) knowledge flows must balance exploration 
with exploitation; and 5) enhancing knowledge 
flows requires simultaneous attention to people, 
processes, organizations and technologies. Such 
insights focus specifically on knowledge and 
its role in enabling and sustaining competitive 
advantage. These insights are broadly applicable 
and ripe for generalization into principles that 
can be harnessed. For instance, the organization 
understanding how knowledge differs from in-
formation may begin to view its IT investments 
in new light; since any competitive advantage 
conferred through IT is likely to be ephemeral, an 
increased—yet balanced—investment allocation 
in people, processes and organizations, in addition 
to technology, may prove wise over time.
Such insights are also actionable and can be 
used to support management decision making. For 
instance, understanding the uneven distribution 
of knowledge and the importance of it flowing 
smoothly through an organization can be acted 
upon daily. In addition to focusing and relying 
upon the levels or stocks of knowledge (i.e., a 
relatively static view) in various people and parts 
of the organization, leaders and managers may 
find it useful to also consider and emphasize the 
movements or flows of such knowledge (i.e., a 
comparatively dynamic view). This could affect 
hiring, staffing, educating, training, mentoring, 
organizing, alliancing and like, key decisions 
made daily in most organizations.
Finally, such insights can help to orient 
continued research as well. For instance, under-
standing how tacit knowledge supports greater 
appropriability than explicit knowledge does can 
help to focus research on the comparative costs 
and benefits associated with investments in tacit 
versus explicit knowledge. Where the power of 
tacit knowledge is sufficiently great, with respect 
to that of explicit knowledge, to offset the compara-
tive difficulty associated with getting such tacit 
knowledge to flow through an organization, lead-
ers and managers should devote correspondingly 
greater time, energy, attention and money toward 
promoting tacit knowledge flows, and vice versa. 
However, a dearth of research addresses such key 
topics as measuring knowledge power, comparing 
the relative costs of investments focused on tacit 
versus explicit knowledge, identifying means 
to accelerate tacit knowledge flows, and others 
with potential to enrich management capability 
and potentially alter the nature and sustainability 
of competitive advantage. These and like topics 
comprise an exciting research stream, and we 
encourage others to help find solutions to the 
perplexing problems that result.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Competitive Advantage: Outperforming an 
organization’s competitors.
Ephemeral Competitive Advantage: Com-
petitive advantage that cannot be sustained over 
time.
Explicit Knowledge: Knowledge that has 
been articulated.
Knowledge: An enabler of action.
Knowledge Flow: Movement of knowledge.
Knowledge Power: Efficacy of knowledge-
based action.
Sustainable Competitive Advantage: Com-
petitive advantage that can be sustained over time.
Tacit Knowledge: Knowledge that has not 
been articulated.
